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ADVERSE PUBLICITY AND
SEC ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURE
ROBINSON B. LACY*

The investigative and enforcement activities of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) often give rise to adverse publicity concerning private parties before any formal determination that they have violated the law. The report that a government agency suspects a person or
product can cause severe harm in any field,I but the impact is especially

likely to be drastic when the agency is the SEC. The daily operations of

the securities industry depend on reputation and trust. 2 Persons subject
to SEC regulation must strive for its favor, because they are confronted
with regulations administered by it at every turn, and because the agency

has broad discretion in administering those legal requirements. 3 Hence,
those subject to SEC regulation will avoid association with targets of the
agency's suspicions. 4 A quarter of a century ago, the Attorney General's
Committee on Administrative Procedure found:
In the case of registration statements in respect of securities, a show-cause order reciting
alleged defects often amounting to fraud, virtually suspends their marketability .... The
same-although perhaps to a less extent-is true when registration of brokers and
dealers, or expulsion from an exchange, is involved. Business is difficult when attempted
to be operated under the cloud of a show cause-order [sic] of this nature.$
6

This observation has been echoed repeatedly.

* A.B. 1974, University of California at Berkeley-, J.D. 1977, Harvard University.
1. See F. Rourke, Secrecy and Publicity: Dilemmas of Democracy 113-36 (1961) [hereinafter
cited as Rourke]. For example, an FDA press conference on suspected cranberry contamination
rendered the nation's entire 1959 crop of largely healthful cranberries unmarketable, resulting in
losses estimated at $40 million. Id. at 127-28; Gellhorn, Adverse Publicity by Administrative
Agencies, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1380, 1408-10 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Gellhorn].
2. Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R1D. 472, 501 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (Weinstein, J.); J. Landis, The
Administrative Process 108 (1938) [hereinafter cited as Landis]; Freeman, A PrivatePractitioner's
View of the Development of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 18,
24 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Freeman].
3. See generally K. Davis, Administrative Law 150-52 (1951).
4. Freeman, supra note 2, at 4.
5. Monograph of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, S. Doc.
No. 10, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 13, Securities and Exchange Commission 43 (1941) [hereinafter
cited as Monograph].
6. See E. Brodsky, Guide to Securities Litigation 21-24 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Brodsky];
Securities and Exchange Commission Advisory Committee on Enforcement Policies and Practices, Report 29 (1972), reprinted in A. Mathews, B. Finkelstein & H. Milstein, Enforcement and
Litigation Under the Federal Securities Laws 313 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Wells Comm. Rep.,
with page numbers as reprinted]; P. Woll, Administrative Law: The Informal Process 21-24
(1963).
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The potential for harm inherent in SEC-created adverse publicity
demands that care be taken to ensure that action likely to give rise to
adverse publicity is taken only when necessary to the SEC's regulatory
responsibilities, and to minimize the impact of such publicity. Moreover,
care is mandated because the harm resulting from adverse publicity is not
confined to persons suspected of misconduct-employees and stockholders also are affected. 7 Finally, the agency should handle adverse publicity
with sensitivity because it relies on the good will and voluntary compliance of most of the public.8 To the extent that the SEC acquires a
reputation for unfairness by causing unnecessary injury, those subject to
its oversight are less likely to maintain a cooperative attitude. 9
Despite these considerations, the SEC's practices affecting reputation
have provoked criticism for many years.' 0 In light of the fact that the
American Law Institute is currently drafting a proposed codification and
revision of all the statutes pertaining to the SEC, 1 I itseems appropriate to
consider a legislative response to the problem of adverse publicity arising
from SEC operations.
It is a traditional view that the external imposition of safeguards on
agency procedures is both unnecessary and undesirable. Just as New
Deal proponents championed agency discretion in developing substantive legal standards, 12 they insisted that administrators could be trusted
to act fairly. Noting the harm caused by adverse publicity arising from
the SEC's initiation of enforcement proceedings, Dean Landis wrote that
fairness would be assured by "professionalism in spirit, the recognition
that arbitrariness in the enforcement of a policy will destroy its effectiveness, and freedom from intervening irrelevant considerations." '1 3 Similarly, the Supreme Court has stated that an agency's expertise in its field
of regulation justifies deference to the procedures which it designs. 14
7.

Wells Comm. Rep., supra note 6.

8. Id. at 298.
9. Persons injured by SEC action are likely to feel they have been treated capriciously,
because the complexity of the legal requirements enforced by the Commission results in many
unintentional violations. See 26 SEC Ann. Rep. 201 (1960).
10. Gellhorn, supra note 1, at 1394-98; see, e.g., Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v.
Douglas, 105 F.2d 100, 105 (D.C. Cir. 1939); Silver King Mines, Inc. v. Cohen, 261 F. Supp.
666, 674 (D. Utah 1966); Letter from A. Mathews to the Advisory Committee on Enforcement
Policies and Practices (May 23, 1972), reprinted in A. Mathews, B. Finkelstein & H. Milstein,
Enforcement and Litigation Under the Federal Securities Laws 363-67 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Mathews Letter, with page numbers as reprinted].
11. See ALI Fed. Sec. Code (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-6, 1972-77).
12. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1667,
1677-78 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Stewart].
13. Landis, supra note 2, at 111; accord, W. Gellhorn, Federal Administrative Proceedings
72-73 (1941) [hereinafter cited as Administrative Proceedings].
14.

FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 290 (1965); accord Stone v. SEC, 466 F.2d 316, 322

(D.C. Cir. 1972).
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There is little theoretical justification for this view. Deference to administrative expertise with regard to the formulation of substantive legal
requirements has surface plausibility if one is willing to assume that a
technology of social engineering together with adequate data will ordinarily yield a "correct" plan for directing an area of social activity.15
However, expertise concerning securities markets or public utilities does
not necessarily entail a heightened sense of fairness, or competency as to
procedural safeguards. Moreover, the commitment to particular governmental policies which is expected of agencies often is inconsistent with
the distinct social policies favoring individual rights.
In fact, experience seems to account for the traditional confidence in
administrators' fairness. 16 Yet, recent experience tends to undermine
that confidence with respect to the SEC. Although the SEC has long been
8
esteemed for fairness, 17 it has recently come under increasing criticism. '
Both the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Banking Committee and a committee of the American Bar Association Section of
Corporation, Banking and Business Law have initiated studies of
alleged disregard for professional standards and due process on the
part of the SEC staff. 19 Furthermore, the Commission has rejected
most of the suggestions for new procedural safeguards advanced by its
own Advisory Committee on Enforcement Policies and Practices
(hereinafter referred to as the Wells Committee). 20 This Article will
examine several features of the Commission's procedure, and the
problems and proposals to which they have given rise, in order to
1
suggest corrective legislation. 2
15.
16.

Stewart, supra note 12, at 1678.
See Administrative Proceedings, supra note 13, at 68-69. See also 2 L. Loss, Securities

Regulation 1334 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss].
17. Wells Comm. Rep., supra note 6, at 1-2; Freeman, supra note 2, at 18.
18. Sommer, The Commission and the Bar: Forty Good Years, 30 Bus. Law. 5 (1974); see
Securities Enforcement: A Growth Industry-The Critics, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), April 13,
1977, at AA-1 [hereinafter cited as The Critics];Freedman, A Civil LibertarianLooks at Securities
Regulation, 35 Ohio St. L.J. 280 (1974).
Former Commissioner Sommer has acknowledged the inclination of enthusiastic staff members, frustrated when dealing with more experienced private counsel, to resort to improper
"strong assertions of authority." Sommer, supra at 12; accord, The Critics, supra at AA-6 (views
of Milton Freeman and former SEC Chairman Garrett).
19. Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), Oct. 26, 1977, at A-I; The Critics, supra note 18, at AA-2.
20. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5310 (Sept. 27, 1972).
21. One of the few commentators to deal at length with the problem of adverse publicity
caused by administrative agencies concludes that external controls must be supplied primarily by
the courts. He would limit the role of legislation to making judicial review available and generally
directing agencies to adopt means to assure accuracy and to issue retractions of incorrect
publicity. Gellhorn, supra note 1, at 1434 n.220. However, the courts traditionally have been
reluctant to curb alleged abuses of enforcement powers by federal agencies, see SEC v. Wall St.
Transcript Corp., 422 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970); SEC v. National
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PRIVATE INVESTIGATIONS

SEC enforcement proceedings are generally preceded by a private
investigation. 22 Typically a Regional Administrator, acting on his own
authority or on directions from Washington, 23 will assign two staff
24
attorneys to conduct an informal inquiry, without subpoena power.
Sometimes the staff concludes that no action is necessary, or that a
warning to the offender is sufficient. 25 If the use of compulsory process
becomes necessary, the staff members must apply to the Commission for
an order for a formal investigation, authorizing the issuance of subpoenas. 26 The Commission's rules do not require that the target of the
investigation ever be notified, 27 and the target is, in practice, usually not
notified 28 until the staff is either contemplating recommending proceedings 29 or has decided not to recommend any action. 30 The target may,
however, 3learn
of the investigation from witnesses who have been called
to testify. 1
Despite attempts to conduct these investigations in secret, their
existence usually becomes known to the public. 3 2 Witnesses may divine
the staff's suspicions from the questions they are asked and from the
order for the investigation, 33 which they are entitled to inspect. 34 The
Student Marketing Corp., 68 F.R.D. 157 (D.D.C. 1975), aff'd per curiam, 538 F.2d 404 (D.C.
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1073 (1977), especially alleged abuses involving adverse
publicity, Rourke, supra note 1, at 150; see Schmidt v. United States, 198 F.2d 32 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 896 (1952). But see Silver King Mines, Inc. v. Cohen, 261 F. Supp. 666 (D.
Utah 1966). Hence, more elaborate statutory controls seem necessary.
22. Mathews, Witnesses in SEC Investigations, 3 Rev. Sec. Reg. 923 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as Mathews]; see 17 C.F.R. §§ 202.5(a), 203.5 (1977).
23. 3 Loss, supra note 16, at 1886, 1949.
24. 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(a) (1977); Tew & Freedman, Practice in SEC Investigatory and
Quasi-JudicialProceedings, 27 U. Miami L. Rev. 1, 6-7 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Tew &
Freedman].
25. 26 SEC Ann. Rep. 201 (1960). In a small number of cases, the staff informally obtains an
undertaking from the target. Thomforde, Negotiating Administrative Settlements in SEC
Broker-DealerDisciplinaryProceedings, 52 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 237, 243-45 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as Negotiating Settlements].
26. 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(a) (1977); Wells Comm. Rep , supra note 6, at 302.
27. See 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(c) (1977).
28. Monograph, supra note 5, at 37; Tew & Freedman, supra note 24, at 7. This may be
changing. A recent article asserts that "in practice most respondents are notified that their
activities are under investigation . . . ." Negotiating Settlements, supra note 25, at 248.
29. See 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(c) (1977). See generally text accompanying notes 69-84, 120-30
infra.
30. See 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(d) (1977).
31. Monograph, supra note 5, at 37.
32. Wells Comm. Rep., supra note 6, at 302.
33. Monograph, supra note 5, at 37.
34. 17 C.F.R. § 203.7(a) (1977).
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first group to learn of the investigation is typically made up of those with
whom the target does business, who are the most promising witnesses, yet
3S
whose knowledge of the inquiry is the most damaging to the target.
Upon learning of an SEC investigation, the public has traditionally
36
assumed that the subject has in fact violated the law.
Since it is ordinarily impossible to be certain whether a violation has
occurred before an investigation is launched, there are serious risks of
injuring innocent parties. The resulting harm to reputation would be
reduced if the staff were required to give the target notice of the investigation and the nature of the suspected violation as soon as possible. This
would permit the party to deny or attempt to rebut the charges. In
addition, some parties might be willing to settle promptly, in order to
37
avoid a long period of uncertainty and possibly exaggerated suspicions.
Others might also benefit from prompt notification. If the target is prepared to settle at once, agency resources will be freed for other work. 38
Furthermore, many issuers now disclose investigations of which they are
aware in filings with the SEC 39 and in reports to stockholders, 40 thus
furthering the SEC's policy of keeping investors fully informed. Of
course, in some cases, notification will permit a target to impede the
investigation, but the agency should be required to give notice when
practicable. Notice to the target would still be a far from complete
solution, because it would not be practical in every case, and because the
target's necessarily self-serving denial of the charges is likely to carry less
weight in the public mind than the suspicions of the Commission.
The Wells Committee suggested that all formal orders and letters
accompanying subpoenas prominently display a statement that institution of an investigation does not mean that the Commission has concluded that a violation has occurred. 4 1 Recently, the Commission implemented this suggestion in part, by including in subpoenas a notice that
the "investigation should not be taken as an adverse reflection on any
'42
individual, business or security.
Although helpful, even these efforts are far from a complete solution
35. See Merrifield, Investigations by the Securities and Exchange Commission, 32 Bus. Law.
1583, 1594 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Merrifield).
36. Wells Comm. Rep., supra note 6, at 302.

37. See text accompanying notes 113-20 infra.
38. Disposition of most cases by settlement is essential to SEC enforcement. See Securities
Enforcement: A Growth Industry-SECs Expanding Programs, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA),
April 27, 1977, at AA-1,

39.

AA-7.

See Wall St. J., April 6, 1977, at 38, col. 4.

40. See N.Y. Times, April 29, 1977, § D, at 1, col. 1; Tenneco Inc., 1976 Ann. Rep. 36-37
(1977).

41.

Wells Comm. Rep., supra note 6, at 303.

42.

Merrifield, supra note 35, at 1594.
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because the Commission could never deny the suspicion of misconduct
manifested by the investigation, and news of that suspicion would itself
impede participation in the securities markets. 43 In any event, such
statements should not be limited to inclusion in orders and subpoenas.
Witnesses may be interviewed before an order or subpoena is issued,4 4 and
there is presently no requirement that every witness be shown the order
once it issues. 45 Hence, the staff should also be required to deliver the
statement in4 6any initial communication with a witness, whether oral or
in writing.
Sometimes the staff will decide not to recommend any action against
the target, but the rumors and suspicions will persist. Accordingly, the
Wells Committee recommended that, where practicable, the Commission should notify the target that the staff has completed its investigation
and determined not to seek proceedings. 47 In response, the Commission
provided by rule that the staff might in its discretion advise the target that
the investigation had been terminated, but warned that such notice
should be construed neither as an exoneration nor as an assurance that no
action would result from the inquiry. 48 The Commission argued that it
often was difficult to tell when an investigation had been completed, and
that it would be misleading to indicate that an investigation had been
terminated when it might still be reopened. It also expressed concern that
a notice of termination
might be asserted as a defense in subsequent
49
proceedings.
However, the fundamental distinction between an investigation and
an adjudication5 0 would deny any res judicata effect to the proposed
notice.5 I Indeed, in an early case where the respondent was represented
by counsel, introduced evidence, and cross-examined witnesses during
the investigation, the Commission established its authority to order proceedings even though the respondent knew of a staff recommendation of
43. See text accompanying notes 2-5 supra.
44. See text accompanying notes 23-26 supra.
45. See 17 C.F.R. § 203.7(a) (1977).
46. Brodsky, supra note 6, at 25-27. In the Brigadoon Scotch investigation, the district court
issued a protective order requiring such a statement, but the court of appeals reversed. SEC v.
Brigadoon Scotch Distrib. Co., 480 F.2d 1047, 1056-57 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 915
(1974).

47. Wells Comm. Rep., supra note 6, at 304.
48. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5310 (Sept. 27, 1972) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(d)
(1977)).
49. Id.
50. See In re SEC, 84 F.2d 316, 317-18 (2d Cir.), rov'd as moot sub nom. Bracken v. SEC,
299 U.S. 504 (1936); White, Weld & Co., 1 S.E.C. 574, 575 (1936).
51.

Cf. L. Jaffe & N. Nathanson, Administrative Law: Cases and Materials 616 (3d ed. 1968)

[hereinafter cited as Jaffe] (distinction between adjudications and advisory opinions).
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no action.5 2 In addition, the difficulty in determining when a particular
investigation has been concluded poses no obstacle to informing the
target that the staff does notpresently anticipate further inquiry, and does
not presently intend to recommend proceedings. Furthermore, it would
contribute to sound administration as well as to the protection of private
reputation if the staff were required to complete investigations as
expeditiously as practicable and to dispose of a matter one way or
5 3
another.
II.

ADJUDICATORY PROCEEDINGS

A.

Institution of Proceedings

The adverse publicity resulting from the institution of public enforcement proceedings may have as severe an impact on the respondent or
defendant as any formal sanction ultimately imposed. S4 The SEC issues
press releases announcing such proceedings. s s Newspapers publicize the
52. White, Weld & Co., 1 S.E.C. 574 (1936). The traditional doctrine that advice by an
agency that specified conduct is legal, combined with reliance, does not estop the agency from
initiating proceedings on the basis of that conduct, seems to be losing its authority. See Jaffe,
supra note 51, at 616-22. However, mere termination of an investigation does not imply that
particular conduct is legal, and it is difficult to see how a target could rely on the staff's decision
not to recommend proceedings.
53. In fact, a recognition of this seems implicit in the Commission's policy of issuing formal
orders for investigation which expire automatically after six months. See Mathews Letter, supra
note 10, at 363.
54. Wells Comm. Rep., supra note 6, at 313.
55. 17 C.F.R. § 201.6(c) (1977). Originally, SEC press releases described the alleged misconduct in great detail and stated that the Commission had "reasonable cause to believe" the facts
alleged. 3 Loss, supra note 16, at 1901 n.36; see Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v.
Douglas, 105 F.2d 100, 105 (D.C. Cir. 1939). In 1939, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit criticized the detailed description of the alleged misconduct as likely
"to cause serious prejudice to the [affected party] and bring it, in advance of any hearing, into
public disrepute." 105 F.2d at 104-05. The court also objected that the assertion that the allegations
were believed to be true created an impression of prejudgment which was inconsistent with the
SEC's adjudicatory responsibilities. Id. Subsequently, the Commission adopted a new formula,
stating that members of its staff had reported certain information which, if true, tended to show
that the law had been violated. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 4287 (July 25,
1949). This, in turn, was criticized by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
as creating an impression of prejudgment. N. Sims Organ & Co. v. SEC, 293 F.2d 78, 81 (2d Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 968 (1962). See also Timbers & Garfinkel, Examination of the
Commission's Adjudicatory Process: Some Suggestions, 45 Va. L. Rev. 817, 824-27 (1959).
Although the notice avoids suggesting a predetermination of the facts, the court may have been
concerned that it implied a prejudgment of the legal issue of whether the facts alleged constituted
a violation. The formula was then revised to state that the staff charged "that information
developed in its investigation tends, if true, to show" a violation. SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 6697 (Jan. 2, 1962). See also 6 Loss, supra note 16, at 4030 (Supp. 1969). Current
releases state, first, that "[tihe proceedings are based upon allegations by the staff that"
respondent violated certain provisions, and second, that "[a] hearing will be scheduled.., for the
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allegations of SEC complaints.5 6 Although in the case of some administrative hearings, the Commission may order either public or private
proceedings, 5 7 there are often compelling reasons to proceed publicly. 5 8
All court proceedings are public, as are all stop order hearings.5 9 Hence,
the decision to institute proceedings is of the greatest importance. Many
years ago, the Commission's General Counsel remarked:
Whether the S.E.C. on final consideration will actually decide to enter a stop order is
interesting, but not very important; for only a rare investor would purchase securities
threatened with the administrative bar. When the S.E.C. actually delists a security, the
60
news is important; but the market drops when the order for hearing is announced.

Ever since the SEC was established, parties have sought an opportunity to be heard before proceedings are ordered. 6 1 A prospective defendant or respondent may be able to explain his conduct, so as to convince
the Commission either to forego proceedings entirely or to drop the most
serious charges. 62 The decision to order proceedings does not turn simply
purpose of determining whether the allegations are true .... " SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 13244 (Feb. 4, 1977). Only the most summary indication is given of the specific
misconduct alleged. See id.
Several commentators have suggested that an agency intending to issue a notice of proceedings
or other release suggesting misconduct should give the affected party an opportunity to prepare a
response which would be published together with the agency's release. 1 Attorney General's
Committee on Administrative Procedures, Final Report 266 (1941); Lemov, Administrative
Agency News Releases: Public Information Versus Private Injury, 37 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 63, 78
(1968). The Federal Securities Code provides that, where practicable, the SEC shall give advance
notice to parties subject to adverse comment in public reports, in order to permit them to prepare
a reply. ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 1505(d)(3) (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1974). This provision only applies
to reports issued pursuant to § 1505(d)(2), and not to notices of administrative proceedings, which
are authorized by § 1513(c) of the Code. This gap in the coverage of § 1505(d)(3) is surely
undesirable with respect to the occasional instances in which notices of proceedings indicate
misconduct by parties other than the respondent. See Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959); Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v.
Douglas, 105 F.2d 100, 105 (D.C. Cir. 1939). As to them, the notice is indistinguishable from a
public report. And in general, the danger of imposing a sanction before an adjudication of
wrongdoing seems to call for allowing the respondent an opportunity to reply to the allegations
described in the notice. Further, the agency should be required to publish the reply along with Its
own release. This procedure would contribute to the full and accurate reporting to which the SEC
is committed and, in the case of notices of proceedings, would help avoid the impression of
prejudgment.
56. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, April 29, 1977, § D, at 1, col. 1.
57. E.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 22, 15 U.S.C. § 78v (1970); 17 C.F.R. §
201.11(b) (1977).
58. See text accompanying notes 96-99 infra.
59. Securities Act of 1933, § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 77u (1970).
60. Monograph, supra note 5, at 43.
61. See White, Weld & Co., 1 S.E.C. 574 (1936); Mathews Letter, supra note 10, at 363-67.
62. Mathews Letter, supra note 10, at 365.
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on the likelihood that a violation can be proved, because the SEC does not
seek formal sanctions for every known violation. 63 Yet, it seems
impossible for the SEC to consider relevant factors such as the target's
willingness to make restitution and to take measures to comply with
the law unless he is allowed to be heard.
In the early case of White, Weld & Co. ,64 the prospective respondent
was allowed to introduce evidence and cross-examine opposing witnesses
during the investigation prior to the institution of a formal adjudicatory
proceeding. However, regular use of such an extensive preliminary hearing seems inappropriate. The central purposes of conducting proceedings
publicly when the respondent or defendant would prefer that they be
private require that the public be promptly apprised of the SEC's
charges. 65 These purposes would be ill-served by the delay required for
elaborate proceedings before formal enforcement action is commenced.
If, on the other hand, these grounds for conducting public proceedings
are absent, and the respondent wishes to avoid publicity, it would be
more expedient simply to order private proceedings. The SEC is required
to conduct stop order proceedings publicly, but this problem would be
eliminated by the proposal embodied in the American Law Institute
Federal Securities Code, to give the Commission the same discretion
regarding stop orders as it now enjoys respecting all other administrative
proceedings. 66 Finally, when court proceedings are contemplated, an
extensive preliminary hearing poses a severe strain on law enforcement
resources. In White, Weld & Co., the parties stipulated that the record of
67
the preliminary investigation could be used in subsequent proceedings.
Even when such a stipulation is acceptable, however, it does not avoid
requiring two factfinders to familiarize themselves with all the evidence.
Furthermore, in some cases involving questions of credibility, it may be
inappropriate for the court or administrative law judge to make a decision without observing the demeanor of the witnesses.
A number of less formal and less time-consuming procedures have been
devised. The staff regularly grants requests from the targets of investigations to appear and present their side of the story. 68 In 1970, the Commission directed the staff to set forth separately, in recommendations for
proceedings, any contentions regarding the facts or law advanced by the
prospective defendant or respondent. 69 The Commission also permits
63.
64.

26 SEC Ann. Rep. 201 (1960); 'Negotiating Settlements, supra note 25, at 244-46.
1 S.E.C. 574 (1936).

65. See text accompanying notes 96-97 infra.
66. ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 1513(e) & Comment 23(a) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1977).
67.

1 S.E.C. 574, 576 (1936).

68. But see Mathews Letter, supra note 10, at 364.
69. Memorandum from the Commission to All Division Directors and Office Heads Re:
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anyone who becomes involved in an investigation to submit a written
70
statement, which is submitted along with the staff recommendation.
These procedures provide adequate opportunity to be heard without
seriously straining agency resources in normal cases. Since it is impractical to decide the legal and factual issues before the adjudicatory proceeding, the function of an opportunity to be heard at this stage is simply to
alert the decisionmaker to facts of which he may be unaware, or legal and
policy arguments which he may have overlooked. Hence, the aspects of a
plenary hearing not afforded by these procedures-the opportunity to
attack the credibility of witnesses and to rebut opposing arguments-are
unnecessary. On the other hand, the procedures do not significantly
burden the agency, because testimony by an involved party actually
furthers the aims of the staff investigation, and a review of reasonable
written statements is not very time consuming.
However, the SEC's current practice is seriously flawed because some
persons are not afforded the benefit of these procedures. There is no
requirement that a party be notified that proceedings against him are
under consideration, 7 1 and occasionally parties do not learn that they are
suspected by the Commission until public proceedings have been insti72
tuted against them, even though the staff has ample time to give notice.
The Commission has rejected the suggestion that it adopt a procedure to
ensure that, where practicable, prospective defendants and respondents
are apprised of the contemplated action7 3 on the ground that it "cannot
Procedures Followed in the Institution of Enforcement Proceedings, Sept. 1, 1970, reprinted in
SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 68 F.R.D. 157, 165-66 (D.D.C. 1975), ff'd per
curiam, 538 F.2d 404 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 4Z9 U.S. 1073 (1977) [hereinafter cited as

Memorandum].
70. 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(c) (1977). On one occasion, the staff failed through inadvertence to
deliver a written submission until after the Commission had decided to institute subpoena
enforcement proceedings. The respondents' subsequent request for an oral hearing was denied.
Respondents' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion To Enforce Subpoena, and in Support of
Cross Motion for Protective Order at 6-7, 10-14, SEC v Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 404 F. Supp.
651 (D.D.C. 1975). The district court enforced the subpoena, remarking that respondents had
admitted there was no legal ground for resisting the order. SEC v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 404
F. Supp. 651, 652 (D.D.C. 1975).

71.

SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 68 F.R.D. 157, 163 (D.D.C. 1975), qff'd per

curiam, 538 F.2d 404 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.

1073 (1977).

72. See Mathews Letter, supra note 10, at 363-64. In the National Student Marketing case,
three persons who had received no indication that they were suspected before they were named
defendants in an injunctive action promptly obtained summary judgment in their favor.
Mathews, Effective Defense of SEC Investigations: Laying the Foundation for Successful
Disposition of Subsequent Civil, Administrative and Criminal Proceedings, 24 Emory L.J. 567,
622 n.183 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Effective Defense]; see SEC v. National Student Marketing
Corp., 360 F. Supp. 284, 300 (D.D.C. 1973).
73. Wells Comm. Rep., supra note 6, at 303-04, 316-17. The suggestion was subsequently
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place itself in a position where, as a result of the establishment of formal
procedural requirements, it would lose its ability to respond to
violative activities in a timely fashion. '' 74 The SEC referred to a case in
which it obtained a temporary restraining order within four hours of
7
learning of a broker-dealer insolvency. S
The Commission's position is unpersuasive. The suggestion was simply that notice be given where practicable, 76 so the possibility of
emergencies, in which there is no time for notice, is irrelevant. Furthermore, in the case of administrative proceedings, the Administrative
Procedure Act requires that agencies give parties an opportunity for "the
submission and consideration of facts, arguments, offers of settlement, or
proposals of adjustment when time, the nature of the proceeding, and the
public interest permit" 77 before formal adjudicatory proceedings are
instituted. Both committee reports on the bill explained that "It]he agency
is required first to afford parties an opportunity for the settlement or
adjustment of issues . ...

"78 The Senate report emphasized:

The preliminary settlement-by-consent provision of this subsection is of the greatest

importance.... The limitation of the requirement to cases in which "time, the nature of
the proceeding, and the public interest permit" does not mean that formal proceedings, to
the exclusion of prior opportunity for informal settlement, lie in the discretion of any
agency irrespective of the facts, legal situation presented, or practical aspects of the case.
It does not mean that agencies have an arbitrary choice, or that they may consult their
79
mere preference or convenience.

The same policy applies to the institution of court proceedings, and in
light of the potential unjustified damage to reputation, notice should be
given wherever practicable.
The determination of whether notice is practicable in a particular
case poses no great difficulty. Upon a proper showing, the Commission
is authorized to obtain a temporary restraining order for any violation,
or threatened violation,8 0 and this is the usual practice where speed is
of the essence since it is faster than holding an administrative proceedrenewed by practitioners. Bialkin & Grienenberger, Summnay of the Meeting Between Members of
the Securities and Exchange Commission and Representatives of the Federal Regulation of
Securities Committee, 30 Bus. Law. 1341, 1345 (1975).
74. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5310 (Sept. 27, 1972).
75. Id.
76. Wells Comm. Rep., supra note 6, at 316.

77. Administrative Procedure Act § 5(c)(I), 5 U.S.C. § 554(c)(1) (1970).
78.

H.R. Rep. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1946) (italics omitted); S. Rep. No. 752,

79th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1946) (italics omitted).
79.

S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1946).

80. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1970); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, § 21(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (Supp. V 1975); Investment Company Act of 1940, §
209(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-41(e) (1970).
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ing.8 1 Use of this procedure whenever the SEC contemplates immediate publicity would afford a determination by a judge as to whether
the circumstances required summary action for the avoidance of public
82
injury.
Moreover, the procedure for issuing a temporary restraining order
provides valuable safeguards against unjustified injury to reputation.
Such an order may not be issued without notice and opportunity for a
hearing 8 3 unless "it clearly appears from specific facts shown by
affidavit or by the verified complaint that immediate and irreparable
injury, loss, or damage will result . . .34 Thus, before the Commission orders public proceedings it should be required to notify prospective defendants of the investigation, permit them to furnish testimony
to the investigating staff, and allow them to submit a written statement to the Commission, unless it can demonstrate special urgency by
obtaining a temporary restraining order.
B.

The Choice Between Public
and Private Proceedings

Existing statutes give the SEC a choice of holding administrative
proceedings publicly or privately, except that proceedings under the
Securities Act must be public.8s The proposed Federal Securities Code
would give the Commission the same degree of discretion for all
proceedings. 8 6 In light of the injury resulting from mere commencement of a public stop order proceeding, 8 7 permitting the agency to hold
such proceedings privately is clearly desirable. The regulations foreclose a charge that the SEC conducts "Star Chamber" proceedings by
providing that no hearing shall be held privately if all the respondents
request a public hearing. 88 The Code would embody this rule in
statute. 89 Hence, difficulty usually arises only when the agency seeks

81.

3 Loss, supra note 16, at 1980-81.

82.

When a temporary restraining order is sought, it is unlikely that there will be any time to

give advance publicity regarding the action. In addition, in granting or denying the motion, the

judge will decide whether the case requires immediate action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
83. The rule says "notice" only, but "[niotice implies an opportunity to be heard." Sims v.
Greene, 161 F.2d 87, 88 (3d Cir. 1947).

84.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). On the applicability of the rule to temporary restraining orders

sought by the SEC, see 3 Loss, supra note 16, at 19f0.
85. Securities Act of 1933, § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 77u (1970); see ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 1513,
Comment 23(a) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1977).
86. ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 1513(e) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1977).
87. See text accompanying notes 5 & 60 supra.

88.

17 C.F.R. § 201.11(b) (1977).

89.

ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 1513(e)(1) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1977).
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public proceedings, and the respondents would prefer a private hear90
ing.
Originally the SEC held almost all hearings privately. 9 1 At some
point in the fifties, it began to hear most cases publicly, except for disciplinary proceedings against lawyers and accountants. 92 In 1970 the
Commission issued an internal memorandum stating, inter alia, that it
would ordinarily order private proceedings to avoid injury to reputation. 93 By 1973, however, only about a third of all hearings were
private, 94 and in a recent interview with the author the Director of the
Boston Regional Office was unable to recall a recent private hearing in
broker-dealer proceedings. The regulations provide that all hearings,
except on applications for confidential treatment under the Securities
Act, shall be public unless otherwise ordered. 95
The publicity generated by an order for public proceedings may alert
the public to avoid possible ineptitude or fraud. 96 The public hearing
may itself furnish interested parties with information allowing them to
institute private litigation, a matter of special urgency because of the
91
short statutes of limitations for some actions under the securities acts.
The hearing may also provide information helpful in prosecuting such
actions. 98 Furthermore, publicity concerning the hearing may attract
additional witnesses for the proceeding itself. 99
Public proceedings also increase public awareness of SEC enforcement
activity and alert regulated parties to new enforcement priorities. 0 0
Standing alone, however, these considerations do not seem to justify the
injury to reputation which these hearings involve. The agency's enforcement activity receives substantial publicity, and public awareness would
be adequately maintained through announcements made after a formal
determination that the affected individual has violated the law. In addi90. An occasional difficulty, not dealt with here, arises when some respondents want a public
hearing, while other respondents in the same proceeding prefer a private hearing. See AU Fed.
Sec. Code § 1513, Comment 23(b) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1977).
91. Gellhorn, supra note 1, at 1396.
92. Id.; Freeman, supra note 2; see note 95 infra.
93. Memorandum, supra note 69, at 166.
94. Gellhorn, supra note 1, at 1396.
95. 17 C.F.R. § 201.11(b) (1977). Similarly, whereas all disciplinary proceedings regarding
lawyers and accountants were formerly private, the Commission recently initiated public disciplinary hearings. The Critics, supra note 18, at AA-9.
96.

2 Loss, supra note 16, at 1334.

97.

See Securities Act of 1933, § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1970); Securities Exchange Act of

1934, § 18(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78r(c) (1970).

98.

2 Loss, supra note 16, at 1334. See also Wells Comm. Rep., supra note 6, at 313-14.

99.

2 Loss, supra note 16, at 1334; cf. FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 294 (1965) (public

FCC investigation).
100. Wells Comm. Rep., supra note 6, at 313-14.
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tion, the Commission has other means to announce its special enforceby individual Commisment concerns, for example, through speeches
10 2
sioners10 1 or through Commission releases.
Finally, a 1967 internal SEC memorandum indicated that it is desirable to hold proceedings publicly when they involve a novel theory of
liability.10 3 This is plainly wrong. The veir fact that the Commission is
asserting a novel theory of liability increases the likelihood that the
subject of the proceeding either has not violated the law or could not have
foreseen that his conduct was illegal. Furthermore, the alternative means
available to the Commission to indicate its enforcement priorities may
also be used to outline new theories. Nonetheless, the legitimate grounds
for publicizing administrative hearings may outweigh the concomitant
injury to reputation in enough cases that one simple resolution of the
public-private issue-requiring private hearings unless the respondents
wish otherwise-is undesirable.
Traditionally, the SEC has not publicly stated its standards for determining whether proceedings should be public or private. 10 4 The third
tentative draft of the Federal Securities Code set forth the considerations
listed in the 1967 memorandum as non-binding guidelines, 10 5 but this
proposal has been withdrawn. 10 6 In the absence of any better guidance
than a staff memorandum never subjected to public comment, it seems
advisable to allow the agency to develop appropriate guidelines.
However, the SEC should be required to articulate the applicable
standards in rules adopted after notice and a public hearing.' 0 7 First,
because of the serious harm likely to result from a determination to
proceed publicly, it is important that the decision be made evenhandedly, and on the basis of carefully thought out policy, and that the
affected party be aware that the decision is so made. Second, the quality
of the standards themselves would improve as a result of both public
comment and of the care likely to be taken by the agency if it is required to
formulate rules of general applicability. In addition, when the Commis101. See, e.g., Sommer, Going Private: A Lesson of Corporate Responsibility, Law Advisory
Council Lecture, Nov. 14, 1974, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) U80,010.
102. See, e.g., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 13437 (Apr. 8, 1977).
103. Memorandum from Stanley Sporkin, Assistant Director, SEC Office of Enforcement,
Division of Trading and Markets, to SEC Regional Offices, Aug. 23, 1967, reprinted in Gellhorn,
supra note 1, at 1397 n.64.
104. See Gellhorn, supra note 1, at 1396-98.
105. ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 1513(e) (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1974).
106. See ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 1513(e) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1977).
107. Specific reference to notice and hearing is required because otherwise the rulemaking,
being concerned with procedure, would not be subject to the normal requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act. See Administrative Procedure Act, § 4(b), 5 U.S.C. § 553(c)
(1970).
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sion orders a public hearing following a request for a private hearing, it
should be required to include in the announcement of the order, as
published in the SEC Docket, its reasons for denying the request. Such a
statement appears to be required by the Administrative Procedure
Act. 10 8 This procedure would contribute to both the fact and the appearance of even-handedness, because it would force the Commission to
articulate its grounds in terms of general standards, and because the
affected party would receive an explanation of how the general standards
apply to his case.
In 1964 the American Bar Association resolved to seek amendment of
the SEC's rules to require that the decision to hold broker-dealer proceedings publicly or privately be made on the basis of the record developed in
a preliminary, private trial-type hearing. 10 9 This seems undesirable. The
delay required would thwart the purposes of holding public proceedings. 1 10 Since a decision concerning the institution of proceedings cannot
turn on definite conclusions regarding the facts or the law, the opportunities to test witnesses and argue against particular legal theories,
which are afforded by a trial-type hearing, are unnecessary. Instead,
appropriate opportunity to be heard respecting the public-private decision can be afforded through the same procedure by which the respondent should be allowed to draw to the Commission's attention considerations it may have overlooked in connection with the initial decision to
institute proceedings. 11 1 In fact, since extreme speed is not required, that
procedure is especially well suited for making the public-private decision.
That decision need only be made in administrative proceedings, and in
contemplating such proceedings the SEC has already declined to seek, or
1 12
failed to obtain, a temporary restraining order.
C.

Settlement Before Proceedings
Are Ordered

Prospective respondents and defendants have long sought to minimize
the adverse publicity resulting from SEC enforcement activity by settling3
with the agency before, or immediately after, it institutes proceedings. 11
Advance settlement reduces injury to reputation because: (1) there is only
108. "Prompt notice shall be given of the denial . . . of
other request of an interested person made in connection with
affirming a prior denial or when the denial is self-explanatory,
a brief statement of the grounds for denial." Id. § 6(d), 5

a written application, petition, or
any agency proceedings. Except in
the notice shall be accompanied by
U.S.C. § 555(e).

109.

89 A.B.A. Rep. 135 (1964).

110.

See text accompanying notes 96-97 supra.

111.
112.
113.

See text accompanying notes 62-79 supra.
See text accompanying notes 80-81 supra.
Freeman, Administrative Procedures, 22 Bus. Law. 891, 894-96 (1967).
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one occasion for an agency press release and media coverage, that is, the
settlement, rather than a series of newsworthy events, such as the institution, the outcome, and any significant intervening developments; (2) the
SEC's announced allegations may be less serious; and (3) the language of
be the subject of negotiation, and
the Commission's release may itself114
may thus be rendered less harmful.
Prior to 1970, the staff would enter into negotiations before proceedings were ordered. 115 However, the Commission prohibited this in September of 1970. At that time, the staff was permitted, but not required, to
discuss the facts with the target and to indicate what violations it believed
had occurred, but was told not to reveal what recommendation concerning enforcement action it planned to submit. If the target wished to
discuss settlement, the staff was directed to allow him to present proposals and arguments and include them in the memorandum it submitted to
the Commission. 116 Nonetheless, a subsequent release indicates that the
Commission has construed rule 8 of its Rules of Practice, 1 17 which
appears to pertain to offers of settlement during administrative proceedings, 1 18 to authorize the target to submit an offer of settlement before
proceedings are commenced. 119 In addition, the Commission sometimes
accedes to requests that it authorize the staff to negotiate a settlement
before proceedings are ordered. 120
Of course, none of these procedures are available to a party who has not
been notified of the staffs suspicions until after proceedings have been
commenced. The Commission's failure to ensure that such notice is given
violates its obligation under the Administrative Procedure Act to afford
an opportunity to submit offers of settlement prior to the commencement
of formal administrative proceedings, denies equal justice in all cases,
and should be corrected by requiring notice before proceedings are
instituted, where practicable, as described above.
The SEC's practice regarding Securities Act registrations involves an
especially serious failure to provide an opportunity for "offers of settlement, or proposals of adjustment" 12 1 before instituting administrative
proceedings. The staff is rarely satisfied with registration statements as
initially submitted, but in most cases it notifies the registrant of the
114.
115.

Merrifield, supra note 35, at 1626-27; Mathews Letter, supra note 10, at 385, 388.
Wells Comm. Rep., supra note 6, at 318-19; Mathews Letter, supra note 10, at 384-85.

116.
117.
118.

Memorandum, supra note 69.
17 C.F.R. § 201.8 (1977).
See 17 C.F.R. § 201.1 (1977).

119. See SEC Securities Exchange
120. Merrifield, supra note 35, at
procedure was apparently used in SEC
1976).
121. Administrative Procedure Act

Act Release No. 12255 (March 25, 1976).
1629; Effective Defense, supra note 72, at 624. This
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 12254 (March 25,
§ 5(b)(1), 5 U.S.C. § 554(c)(1) (1970).
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necessary
amendments without recommending stop order proceed1 22
ings.

However, a proceeding is instituted without affording the

registrant a locus poenitentiae "when the deficiencies appear to stem
from careless disregard of the statutes and rules or a deliberate attempt
to conceal or mislead or where the Commission deems formal proceedings necessary in the public interest."1 23 A private investigation may
be conducted before proceedings are launched, but this is not essential.-1 24 Institution of a stop order proceeding renders the securities
unmarketable whether or not a formal sanction is ultimately imposed. 125
This procedure is inexcusable. An improperly prepared registration
presents no imminent threat to the public. It does not become effective for
twenty days, 12 6 ample time to suggest amendment or withdrawal of the
application. If the errors are due to negligence, this procedure may punish
the issuer for the failings of its lawyer. Furthermore, Congress has
filing a defective registraprovided an appropriate deterrent to wilfully
127
tion statement by making it a felony.
A former Commissioner attempted to justify this practice on the
grounds that "[i]n these cases, the use of the letter of comment which was
designed to assist registrants who have conscientiously attempted to
comply with the act would be meaningless. ' 128 This assumes the letter of
comment procedure is a matter of administrative grace. In fact, while the
Securities Act appears to contemplate that a stop order proceeding would
be the normal response to defective registration statements, 1 29 it would
be impossible for the SEC to operate on this basis. 130 The burden of
justification lies with the necessarily extraordinary use of the formal
procedure. Moreover, if the SEC actually operated as contemplated by
the statute, institution of stop order proceedings would be a normal
incident of issuing securities and such proceedings would not have the
severe impact which they now have. Hence, the lack of safeguards in the
statute does not justify the Commission's failure to create them as part of
the nonstatutory procedure it has developed. The SEC should be re122. 1 Loss, supra note 16, at 273.
123. 17 C.F.R. § 202.3(a) (1977).
124. 1 Loss, supra note 16, at 274-75.
125. See text accompanying note 60 supra. Of course, since almost all registration statements
are defective in some respect when filed, the Commission will always have a legal basis for
imposing the sanction.
126. Securities Act of 1933, § 8(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77h(a) (1970).
127. Id. § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
128. Orrick, Organization, Proceduresand Practices of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 50, 63 (1959).
129. See Securities Act of 1933, § 8(b), (d), 15 U.S.C. § 77h(b), (d) (1970).
130. For another instance in which the statute is unworkable as written, see 1 Loss, supra
note 16, at 277-79 (standard 20-day waiting period after last amendment).
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quired to notify a registrant of deficiehcies in a filing and allow it to take
corrective action, before ordering formal proceedings.
The SEC has never formally announced the various procedures for
seeking a settlement before proceedings are commenced. The decision
not to let the staff negotiate settlements was unknown even to experienced practitioners until it was mentioned in a published interview
31
with several Commissioners and staff members six months later.1
The memorandum itself, which specified the procedures to be followed
when a party involved in an investigation wishes to discuss settlement,
only became public when it was appended to a published court
opinion. 13 2 An experienced practitioner disclosed the possibility of
obtaining Commission authorization for negotiations before proceedings are ordered in a law review article13 3-he himself apparently did
34
not learn of the procedure for some time after it became available.1
The SEC's secretiveness violates section 3(a) of the Administrative
Procedure Act: "Each agency shall separately state and currently
publish in the Federal Register for the guidance of the public- . . (B)
statements of the general course and method by which its functions are
channeled and determined, including the nature and requirements of
all formal and informal procedures available.' 3 5 The House Report
on the Administrative Procedure Act specifically noted that "[p]ursuant
to section 3(a) agencies would be required to state settlement proce13 6
dures in their rules."'
The Commission's secretiveness is also administratively unsound.
Presumably, informal settlement procedures are made available because they serve the public interest. The public interest would seem
better served if more people knew about these procedures and were
able to use them. Secrecy also denies equal justice. Parties represented
by counsel who do not work with the staff on a regular basis are
denied opportunities to avoid serious injury to reputation which are
available to the clients of a privileged coterie of insiders. The Senate
Report on the Administrative Procedure Act commented: "[Section 3(a)]
has been drawn upon the theory that administrative operations and
131.
132.
133.

See Mathews Letter, supra note 10, at 386.
See Memorandum, supra note 69.
Effective Defense, supra note 72, at 624.

134. See Mathews Letter, supra note 10, at 389 n.23. Similarly, the fact that the staff will
regularly permit an affected party to appear and testify, see text accompanying note 68 supra,
does not appear in the regulations, and the longstanding practice of allowing such parties to

submit written statements to the Commission was not formally announced until SEC Securities
Act Release No. 5310 (Sept. 27, 1972); see Wells Comm. Rep., supra note 6, at 315-16.
135. Administrative Procedure Act § 3(a)(1)(B), 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(B) (1970).
136. H. R. Rep. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1946).
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procedures are public property which the general public, rather than a
few specialists or lobbyists, is entitled to know or to have the ready
means of knowing with definiteness and assurance."' 13 7 Finally, secret
procedures preclude salutary public criticism and comment.
The Wells Committee 38 and others 13 9 have suggested that the
Commission reinstitute, on a regular basis, the practice of allowing the
staff to negotiate settlements before recommending proceedings. To be
sure, for the purpose of preventing injury due to adverse publicity, an
opportunity to settle is substantially less important than an opportunity
to convince the agency not to institute public proceedings. The small
broker who may be put out of business by the announcement of
proceedings 140 has little to gain from a simultaneous announcement
that he has consented to the imposition of a sanction. Settlement is
desired by parties who can weather both the adverse publicity resulting from the proceedings and the sanction to which they are prepared
to consent. On the other hand, the agency can settle, and therefore
handle, more cases if it negotiates settlements in advance.' 4 1 And, by
avoiding needless injury to reputation, it contributes to the good will
and cooperativeness of parties subject to its regulation.
Commissioner Herlong justified the 1970 directive on the ground
that the staff was putting unfair pressure on parties to settle by
threatening proceedings which might never occur. 14 2 But all settlement
negotiations, whether conducted before or after proceedings are commenced, involve efforts by both sides to avoid something which might
never happen. Negotiations by the SEC staff before proceedings are
ordered are actually less susceptible of abuse than other, similar kinds
of bargaining. In criminal cases, for example, plea bargaining creates a
danger that the prosecutor will make more serious charges than are
justified in order to cow the defendant, with the result that a party
insisting on a trial runs the risk of an excessive sentence. 14 3 This
danger is reduced in the case of the SEC because the Commission,
which does not participate directly in the bargaining, reviews the
staffs recommendation before proceedings are commenced. In any
event, many of those whom Commissioner Herlong wished to protect
144
would prefer to take their chances with negotiation.
137.

S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1946).

138. Wells Comm. Rep., supra note 6, at 319; The Critics, supra note 18, at AA-13.
139. E.g., Mathews Letter, supra note 10, at 384-89.
140. Brodsky, supra note 6, at 23.
141. Mathews Letter, supra note 10, at 387.
142. Id.
143.

People v. Byrd, 12 Mfich. App. 186, 206,

concurring).
144. Mathews Letter, supra note 10, at 388-89.

162 N.W.2d 777, 787 (1968) (Levin, J.,
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Other Commissioners have justified the decision not to allow
negotiation before proceedings were ordered on the ground that when
a settlement was worked out in advance, the Commission was4 5 deOf
prived of its discretion to decide whether to institute action .
course, the Commission regularly reviews proposals negotiated after
formal action is commenced. 1 4 6 Nevertheless, if the staff and the
affected party have agreed on appropriate measures before the case is
presented to the Commission for the first time, it never receives
competing accounts of the issues on the 14 basis
of which it may
7
determine what sanctions are appropriate.
The Commission's control over instituting proceedings is, however,
of attenuated importance when a settlement is reached in advance.
One reason for not delegating authority to initiate formal action is the
damage to reputation which may result from the determination;1 48 yet
parties wish to settle precisely to avoid injury to reputation. Furthermore, instituting proceedings when a settlement has already been
reached does not involve a significant commitment of agency resources. The enforcement interests of the SEC and the interests of the
private party are well represented in settlement negotiations. Thus,
there seems little reason for denying parties an opportunity to negotiate
before proceedings are ordered.
Still, this does not seem an appropriate matter to resolve by statute.
The impact on reputation of denying an opportunity to negotiate a
settlement is not grave, if parties are afforded an opportunity to be
heard in most cases and to submit a settlement proposal before
proceedings are ordered. The decision whether negotiation should be
allowed involves issues concerning the allocation of responsibilities
within the SEC, which are particularly within the competence of the
Commission. Finally, the Commission has demonstrated a willingness
to experiment with the procedure and has discarded it on the basis of
experience.

145.
146.

Id. at 386-87.
See 17 C.F.R. § 201.8(a)(3) (1977).

147. Mathews Letter, supra note 10, at 387. In addition, it would seem troubling for the SEC
to decline to impose a sanction when both the staff and the private party agree that the law has
been violated, and the target is willing to accept a sanction. Of course, prosecutorial authorities in
this country are generally recognized to have discretion not to prosecute, even when a violation
has occurred, but this is often justifiable because of the need to allocate scarce law enforcement
resources to the most pressing social needs, a factor not present when a party consents to
imposition of a sanction.
148. Monograph, supra note 5.
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III.

PUBLIC REPORTS CONCERNING
PARTICULAR VIOLATIONS

The SEC is authorized to publish information concerning violations
which it discovers in investigations. 14 9 This authority is often put to
legitimate use in connection with legislative and rulemaking activity.15 0 In a few instances, however, the SEC has issued a report
concerning wrongdoings by particular parties, without a legislative or
quasi-legislative purpose and without a prior adjudication of miscon51
duct.
This procedure imposes a serious sanction on a private party without the safeguards of the procedure set forth in the Administrative
Procedure Act' 52 and without the usual opportunity for judicial review.15 3 Thus, it is inconsistent with statutory policies regarding
procedure and review.
In addition, this procedure raises serious constitutional questions.
15 4
Justice Frankfurter, in his concurring opinion in Hannah v. Larche,
wrote:
In appraising the constitutionally permissive investigative procedure claimed to
subject individuals to incrimination or defamation without adequate opportunity for
defense, a relevant distinction is between those proceedings which are preliminaries to
official judgments on individuals and those . . . charged with responsibility to gather
information as a solid foundation for legislative action.... When official pronouncements on individuals purport to rest on evidence and investigation, it is right to
demand that those so accused be given a full opportunity for their defense ....
,ss
149.

Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1970).

150.

See, e.g., SEC, Report on Questionable and Illegal Corporate Payments, reprinted in,

Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 642, pt. II (May 19, 1976). Of course, even such reports pose a
serious danger of injury to private reputation. The Federal Securities Code would require that, if
practicable, a party subject to adverse comment in a report be notified in advance and given an
opportunity to prepare a reply. ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 1505(d)(3) (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1974). See
also note 55 supra.
151. See Ward La France Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943); Alleghany Corp., 6 S.E.C. 960
(1940). SEC Staff Report on Transactions in Securities of the City of New York (Aug. 29, 1977),
excerpted in Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), Aug. 31, 1977, at EI-E7. See also Schmidt v. United
States, 198 F.2d 32 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 896 (1952).
152. The notice requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act are applicable only when
an adjudication on the record after opportunity for a hearing is required by the specific applicable
statute. Administrative Procedure Act § 5(a), 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1970). There is no such
requirement in the section of the Securities Exchange Act authorizing public reports. Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, § 21(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1970).
153. See Schmidt v. United States, 198 F.2d 32 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 896 (1952);
Gellhorn, supra note 1, at 1437-38.
154. 363 U.S. 420 (1960).
155. Id. at 489 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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In Hannah, the challenged procedure was sustained because the
investigation involved was primarily legislative, and because the injury to reputation complained of was not the result of any "affirmative
determinations made by the Commission," but simply of the investiga156
tion itself.
In Jenkins v. McKeithen,15 7 the Court adopted Justice Frankfurter's
position 5 8 in holding that the procedure of a Louisiana commission
violated the due process clause. Although the commission had no
authority to make binding adjudications, the Court concluded that its
primary function was to "expos[e] violations of criminal laws by
specific individuals," in part because its findings were not expected to
be used as a basis for legislation. 15 9 Under these circumstances, the
Commission's procedure was to be measured against the requirements
160
for a criminal trial.
Jenkins may have been overruled, sub silentio, by the Court's recent
decision in Paulv. Davis, 16 1 that the Louisville, Kentucky, police were.
not required to afford any procedural safeguards before circulating a
list of "active shoplifters" to area merchants, containing respondent's
name and photograph. Justice Rehnquist placed the holding on the
broad ground that a good reputation is not included in the "liberty or
property" protected by the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause. 162 However, Justice Rehnquist's opinion is exceedingly problematic. The basic premise is that liberty amd property are limited to
certain interests enumerated in the Bill of Rights and interests recognized and protected by state law.163 Justice Rehnquist recognized that
most states provide legal protection for reputation.1 64 But he appears
to have advanced the theory that, before a due process violation could
be found, officials must not only invade an interest protected by state
law but must also exclude the individual from the class of persons
whose interests are protected by the specific rule of law. 1 65 This would
mean that the murder of a prisoner by a policeman acting in the course
of his duties would not deny due process. 16 6 Hence, the scope of the
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SEC ADVERSE PUBLICITY

limitation on due process protection announced in Paul v. Davis is in
doubt.
In addition, rather than overruling Jenkins v. McKeithen, Paul v.
Davis appears to distinguish that case, noting that the Louisville police
were not "an agency whose sole or predominant function, without
serving any other public interest, [was] to expose and publicize the
names of persons it [found] guilty of wrongdoing." 1 67 Justice Rehnquist
also attached importance to the fact that the actions of the police fell
68
"far short of the more formalized proceedings" sustained in Hannah. 1
Thus, the central concern of Paul v. Davis may be simply to permit
local agencies to issue prompt, informal warnings to the public.
There is no reason why the SEC should continue to have authority
to issue nonlegislative reports on individual wrongdoing. Unlike some
agencies which have publicized misconduct extensively,' 6 9 the SEC
has extensive formal enforcement powers. 170 One of the Commission's
formal reports on individual misconduct seems to have been intended
to publicize the obligations imposed by the new rule lob-5,' 7 1 but the
agency has ample alternative means to alert the public to its respon73
sibilities. 172 In fact, the SEC has made little use of this authority.'
The authority to issue reports on the wrongdoing of individuals has
also been used to block judicial oversight of the misconduct of agency
personnel. 174 This seems clearly improper from the point of view of the
Commission as well as of the injured private party. The SEC's power
to issue reports concerning unadjudicated misconduct should be limited to reports for a legislative or quasi-legislative purpose.
IV.

STATEMENT OF POLICY

Some of the SEC's questionable use of, or failure to control, adverse
publicity can be corrected directly by legislation. However, in many
instances it is necessary to rely on agency rulemaking or on the ad hoc
discretion of the Commission and staff. To govern both rulemaking
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FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
and ad hoc decisions, a statutory statement of policy is desirable.17 5 In
the past, the SEC has shown little sensitivity to the problems of injury
to reputation, and in some instances it has used publicity for improper
purposes.
In particular, the threatened or actual use of adverse publicity to
punish represents a significant abuse of agency discretion. Punishment would seem to be the only purpose underlying the Commission's
institution of stop order proceedings without previously allowing the
registrant an opportunity to amend. 17 6 The staff also uses the threat of
adverse publicity to extract concessions from registrants. 17 7 In at least
one case the SEC apparently issued adverse publicity
over a period of
17 8
years in order to put pressure on an issuer.
The SEC's broad authority to issue reports or otherwise take action
creating adverse publicity does not constitute authority to use publicity
as a sanction. 17 9 The House report on the Administrative Procedure
Act stated:
In short, agencies may not impose sanctions which have not been specifically or
generally provided for them to impose ...
One troublesome subject in this field is that of publicity, which may in no case be
utilized directly or indirectly as a penalty or punishment save as so authorized.
Legitimate publicity extends to the issuance of authorized documents . . .but, apart
from actual and final adjudication . . .no publicity should reflect adversely upon any
person . . .in any manner otherwise than as required to carry on authorized agency
functions and necessary in the administration thereof. It will be the duty of agencies
not to permit informational releases to be utilized as penalties or to the injury of
parties.180

Accordingly, the Act provides that "[a] sanction may not be imposed
18 1
. . except . . . as authorized by law." '
Thus, it should be provided by statute that the SEC shall avoid
creating adverse publicity concerning private parties except as necessary for the performance of authorized agency functions, that reasonable steps shall be taken to minimize the impact of inevitable adverse
publicity unless the publicized misconduct has been made the subject
of a formal sanction, and that in no event shall publicity be used for
the purpose of punishment except following an adjudication of misconduct.
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